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LAW AND THE GHETTO
CONSUMER*
Too often, the poor man sees the law only as something that garnishes his salary; that repossesses his
refrigerator; that evicts him from his home; that cancels
his welfare; that binds him to usury; or that deprives
him of his liberty because he cannot afford bail. ....
1

T

1968 issue of the Catholic Lawyer presented a
symposium evaluating the status and prospects for success of
the current effort to extend legal services to the poor, as part of
the wider "war on poverty."'2 Though that effort is just beginning
and has a long way to go before achieving its objectives of educating,
advising and protecting low-income persons in their legal relations,
it is sufficiently under way so that attention can be profitably
directed toward the body of substantive law with which it must deal.
It is in this area that the real test of legal services to the poor will
come since mere representation in the application of existing laws,
though an improvement, is hardly a solution to some of the basic
inequities of that existing law. The problem for the legal services
attorney is that of seeking to protect his clients within the bounds
of a system of law which has characteristically been formulated and
enforced without any significant attention to, or concern for, the
plight of the poverty-stricken segments of society.3 This is particularly
so as to the low-income person in his capacity as a consumer of
HE SPRING

*This paper is the result of research undertaken by the St. Thomas More
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'Address by Nicholas Katzenbach quoted in Ortique, Too Little, Too Late?,
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2 The O.E.O. and Legal Services-A Symposium, 14 CATHOLIC LAW. 92 (1968).
See also Note, Legal Services and the War On Poverty, 13 CATHOLIC LAW.
272 (1967).
3D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE 189 (1968).

LAW AND THE GHETTO CONSUMER

goods in the modem commercial marketplace. The attorney representing such a
consumer can merely "represent" that consumer when he is faced with the application of legal processes of various sorts at
the behest of a businessman with whom
he has dealt. In essence, he seeks to
assure the fair application of existing principles and statutory provisions. But, by
doing so, he merely contributes to the
status quo and necessarily overlooks the
unique position of the ghetto consumer
who, in most cases, has not freely and
comprehendingly chosen to subject himself to the application of these legal
processes. On the other hand, the attorney can choose to be a "revolutionary" in a non-pejorative sense. He can
take the role of the reformer and seek
affirmatively to challenge the remorseless
application of legal principles to persons
as to whom those principles reflect little
or no concern.
His ingenuity thereby
balances the admirable ingenuity of the
commercial draftsman who is usually the
source of his client's problems. Ingenuity
carried to the extremes of brinksmanship
on either side is not an ideal situation
but, as long as there is room for ingenuity on the draftsman's side, there must
be a corresponding place for such ingenuity on the consumer's side. It is precisely this aspect of reform and challenge
which offers considerable promise as a
short-run approach to the problems of
the nation's poor, while the longer-range
solutions are still in the realm of the
merely possible or contemplated. A prime
example of the use of this ingenuity to
challenge the status quo is discussed in
this paper and, it is suggested, it represents an important point of departure for
further attempts to bring the law to grips
with the problems of poverty.

Michael Harrington,4 in 1964, helped
awaken the nation to the harsh fact of
extensive poverty in the United States and,
by doing so, helped to make possible the
launching of the War on Poverty with the
enactment of the Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964. 5 But, as further research
on, and involvement with, "poverty" has
been undertaken, more than its mere exVarious
istence has become apparent.
community action, legal services and other
programs have brought to light the character and pervasiveness of poverty and its
degrading and demoralizing effects on those
who are mired in it.6 The depredations
of Appalachia, the squalor of Indian reservations, the hand-to-mouth existence of
migrant laborers and the despair of the
"inner city" are now a part of the public
consciousness, at least in their pictorial
forms. But, the harsh details of everyday
life beyond these media images are far
more compelling than those images. Without attempting any detailed description of
those conditions, it would seem useful to
concentrate on the poor resident of the
"inner city" in his capacity as a consumer
of goods and attempt to gain a practical
understanding of what he faces and what,
if anything, the law does to ameloriate
those condiitons.
The most elementary characteristic of
the poor consumer is the fact that, because of his low income, he must rely,
for anything other than day-to-day expenditures, on credit in one form or

4 M.

HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA

(1964).

578 Stat. 508 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2701 (1964).
6 See, e.g., D. CAPLOVITZ, THE POOR PAY MORE

(1968) (detailing specific instances of commercial transactions in which the unsophisticated, low-income consumer is subjected to all
the various manifestations of the local merchant at his "best").
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another. 7 There is also the ironic fact
that our "affluent society,". by its very
preoccupation with the tangible indications of affluence and their acquisition,
is in large part responsible for the creation of these same acquisitive characteristics in those who cannot have them without relying on credit. This points to but
another manifestation, if another is needed, of the yawning gulf between promise
and performance which faces the povertystricken in such a society. Credit, for
this consumer, is not a matter of rational
economic choice or convenience but,
rather, is a matter of real necessity. He
is not an ardent member of the increasingly "cashless society" which relies more
and more on the availability of ready.
credit. And, in contrast to his middleclass counterpart, the low-income consumer generally borrows goods rather
than money since the merchant with
whom he deals invariably retains the
right to repossess until the price of the
goods is fully paid.8 And, in further
contrast, by this very reliance on credit,
the low-income consumer mortgages a
future which is already substantially impaired by the lack of opportunity for
economic advancement (a problem which,
in itself, requires and will continue to
require enormous reflection and effort by
those in a position to attempt a solution
to it). From this dependence on credit
flows the very opportunity for over-reaching and imposition by those from whom
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In a sense, his
the credit comes.'
very lack of economic viability is a
marketable commodity since it provides
the basis upon which the superior party
can exact prices and contract terms which
would not be available to him in dealing
with consumers whose economic position
allows a measure of bargaining power. 10
An additional significant characteristic
of the low-income stratum of society is
its lack of consumer sophistication, a
derivative of its basic economic inferiority.
The "sophistication" apparent in the techniques of "shopping around" and "comparing" results from an opportunity for
realistic choices among products and merchants and the exercise of that opportunity in situations in which the consumer
has the ability to withhold his purchases
in the knowledge that they can be more
The lowfavorably made elsewhere.
income consumer, however, experiences
no such opportunity for choice since his
very lack of means precludes any meanThe
ingful attempt to "go elsewhere."
neighborhood merchant's price may be
higher and/or his product inferior in
quality, but this information is of little
value to the low-income consumer who
realizes that the general merchant outside the neighborhood will sell to him

9See Kripke,
7 D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note
JOINT
LEGISLATIVE
8 N.Y.

LAWYER,

Consumer Credit Regulation: A

Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L.
(suggesting that the
REV. 445, 448 (1968)
image of the predatory merchant may not be

very accurate).
10D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 3, at 19.
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11
The very
on no other terms but cash.
guarvirtually
futility of going elsewhere
antees either a passive submission to
whatever the neighborhood merchant
seeks to exact or an abstention from consumption which is expected of no other
stratum of society. The vicious circle
draws even tighter when the combined
effect of this non-sophistication and lack
of economic viability is viewed in the
business practices of the merchant catering primarily or exclusively to low-income
persons. From a purely business point of
view, the need for competition either as
to price or as to quality diminishes and
his emphasis can be centered on his felt
need for security and reflected in contract
terms which are beyond the awareness
and comprehension of the consumer.
Without any basis upon which to bargain
other than the threat not to buy at all,
which is purely negative to the low-income
consumer, there is little or no reason for
detailed examination of the terms of the

"Furniture and appliance retailers that cater
to the poor in Washington, D.C., charge an
average of 60% more for merchandise than
stores dealing with the general public ...
[T]hose who purchased at low-income stores
paid heavily for the cost of "easy credit,"
door-to-door selling, and collecting on installment contracts ...
11

For example, the wholesale cost of a portable TV set was about $109 to both lowincome and a general market retailer. The
general market retailer sold the set for
$129.95, whereas the low-income market
retailer charged $219.95 for the same set."
Excerpts from Law in Action (the monthly
"newsletter" of the Legal Services Program)
at 1, 12 (April 1968) (reporting on and
quoting from a study conducted by the Federal Trade Commission).
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contract since the consumer is powerless

to affect them; in addition, even having
read them, it is not likely that such a
person would be able to comprehend
their legal significance and thereby obtain
a basis upon which to predicate a rational
choice between accepting and rejecting
them.
There is thus a unique marketplace for
the low-income consumer in which, to a
large extent, caveat emptor thoroughly
displaces any remote possibility that fairdealing and a social conscience will be
brought to bear on transactions taking
place in that marketplace. In this area
the merchant is admittedly filling a need
which other more "reputable" businesses
are unwilling to fill precisely because of
the "poverty" of those on the buyer's
side of the counter. To the extent that
this is true, the ghetto merchant is justified in insisting upon compensation for
the added business risk which his more
conservative counterparts are not willing
to assume at all. In this light, the blight
of the ghetto cannot be attributed solely
or even primarily to the merchant. But,
to the same extent, the merchant's excessive zeal for a security which becomes a
virtually escape-proof trap for the unwary
ghetto resident cannot be blithely written
off as in accord with "reasonable business
needs." It is in this very area of overly
aggressive and oppressive contract terms
that the opportunity for ingenious advocacy on behalf of the poor has been presented and progress has been made in
spite of the business-oriented legal rules
and principles involved, and the very
success of this initial step indicates the
possibilities for further progress in the
future.
In any attempt to make a break-through
on behalf of low-income consumers as

14
contract buyers, the initial obstacle is the
hallowed and time-honored concept of
"freedom of contract."
Reflecting a
laissez-faire attitude toward the problem,
the legal concept involves the idea that
two parties to a contract are free to
fashion the terms and conditions of their
agreement within extremely broad limits
and need only avoid such provisions as
are "unlawful" or "contrary to public
policy." More important than the concept is its legal effect: once the parties
have agreed upon the terms of their contract, the law will hold them to it and
will interfere only when, on an ad hoc
basis, the terms imposed upon one party
are so onerous and so clearly oppressive
that the court cannot lend its powers to
their enforcement." The type of contract
which reflected such a relationship between the contracting parties came to be
known as an "adhesion" contract, one
in which one party, by virtue of his
superior bargaining position or economic
power, could impose his terms on the
weaker party who "accepted" them
simply because he would otherwise be
faced with the prospect of doing without
whatever "benefits" he expected from the
contract.13 The merits of "form" contracts, the typical example of the adhesion contract, depend upon the point
of view from which they are described.
From the business-interest point of view:
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Nothing can approach in speed and sanity
of readaptation the machinery of standard
forms of a trade and for a line of trade,
built to meet the particular needs of that
trade. They save trouble in bargaining.
They save time in bargaining. . . . They
ease administration by concentrating the
need for discretion and decision in such
personnel as can be trusted to be discreet.
This reduces human wear and tear, it
cheapens administration, it serves the ulti4
mate consumer.'
From a more jaundiced and certainly a
more wary point of view, the adhesion
contract has been described as an
effective instrument in the hands of
powerful industrial and commercial overlords, enabling them to impose a new
feudal order of their own making upon
a vast host of vassals. .... 1.
Whatever its benefits in efficiency and
administration, it is clear that the adhesion contract presents inherent dangers
to the very freedom of contract which
lends it an aura of legitimacy since it
permits one party to monopolize that
freedom and deprive the other party of
any share in it. To counter the inherent
unfairness of such contract the courts
had made occasional attempts to restrict
their use and prevent their oppressive
effects. But, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws included a provision in
the proposed Uniform Commercial Code

12 See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. Lockwood,

84
U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873); Siegelman v.
Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d

Cir. 1955).
"Wilson, Freedom of Contract and Adhesion
Contracts, 14 INT. & COMP. L.Q. 172, 176-77
(1965).

14 Lewellyn, Book Review, 52 H~Av. L. REV.
700, 701 (1939).
15 Kessler,
Contracts of
Adhesion-Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contracts, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943).
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to deal with the problem and the courts'
powers in regard to it.1 The provision, in

effect, gave the courts the express power
to refuse to enforce contracts or clauses
whose terms were found to be "unconscionable," without defining the term and
thereby leaving room for a flexibility sufficient to keep pace with changing conditions and contract terms. The provision
was, in reality, but a codification of the
sporadic application of equitable principles to legal actions on contracts.17 The
provision was modified a good deal, however, by the inclusion of a requirement
that the court judge "unconscionability" in
light of the trade practices and commercial needs in existence at the time the
contract was made. (In terms of the
relation between ghetto merchant and
ghetto consumer, if the trade practices
and "needs" of the former were to control,

U.C.C. § 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or
Clause:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds
the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time
it was made the court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or it may enforce
the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit
the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the
court that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court
in making the determination.
36

17 1

N.Y. LAW REV.

STUDY

OF

655 (1955).

THE

COMM'N,

UNIFORM

REPORT AND

COMMERCIAL

CODE

it is unlikely that many, if any, contracts
or constituent clauses would be found
to be unconscionable.)
The provision
was adopted by all but two of the states
which adopted the Code itself."8 As an
indication of its relatively innocuous
terms, the reporters, digests and citators
list almost no cases applying it. But,
among those few citations is a case titled
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co.1 9 which may have enormous impact
on the problems faced by the ghetto
consumer. In that case, each of the
separate defendants had purchased household goods from the plaintiff under printed form contracts. Between 1957 and
1962, Mrs. Ora Williams had purchased
goods worth $1800 and had paid $1400
20
off at the time of the action against her.
At the time of each purchase, Mrs. Williams (the mother of seven children, and
supporting herself and them on public
assistance amounting to $218 per month)
signed a printed form contract under
which she "leased" the particular item at
a stated monthly "rental" and under
which the seller could repossess upon de-

North Carolina and California. The California Advisory Committee which recommended the deletion of this provision did so
on the ground that "giving the courts unqualified power to strike down terms they might
consider 'unconscionable' could result in the
renegotiation of contracts in every case of
disagreement with the fairness of provisions the
parties had accepted." Special Report by the
Cal. State Bar Committee on the Commercial
Code, 37 CALIF. BAR J. 119, 136 (1962).
'

10 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

20The other defendant, Thorne, had bought
under the same conditions between 1957 and
1962.

14
fault in payment. But, in addition, the
form also contained the following clause:
The amount of each periodical installment payment . . . shall be inclusive of
and not in addition to the amount of
each installment payment to be made ...
under such prior leases, bills or accounts;
and all payments now and hereafter made
• . . shall be credited pro rata on all
outstanding leases, bills and accounts

due . . . at the time each payment is
21
made.
In effect, this provision kept a balance
due on every item purchased until the
balance due on all purchases, whenever
made, was liquidated and, therefore, also
preserved the seller's right to repossess
even the first item ever bought under
such a "lease", even though Mrs. Williams had already paid many times the
value of that item. 22 In 1962, Mrs.
Williams, with an outstanding balance
due of $164, contracted to purchase a
$514 stereo (even though the plaintiff
had noted on the reverse side of the contract that she was receiving only $218
per month in public assistance to support
herself and her seven children). Inevitably, she defaulted shortly thereafter and
plaintiff sought to replevy everything she
had bought under such a contract since
1957.

350 F.2d at 447.
"The store's records showed that of a combined total claim of $444 as of December 26,
1962, Ora [Williams] owed 250 on item 1,
purchased December 23, 1957 (price $45.65);
21

22
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Despite its statement that it could not
"condemn too strongly" the conduct of
the seller, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals found itself powerless to give
Mrs. Williams any relief and suggested
that "Congress should consider corrective
legislation to protect the public from such
2
exploitive contracts. .
The Circuit Court of Appeals, however,
found no such lack of power and remanded the case for findings on the issue
of "unconscionability" in terms of guidelines set forth in its opinion. The court
found that the 1965 adoption of the
U.C.C. by Congress (though not applicable to the instant case) was persuasive
authority for following the cases on
"unconscionability" from which section
2-302 had been derived and therefore
held that the courts of the District of
Columbia could refuse to enforce contracts or clauses which they found to be
"unconscionable."
Though the Circuit
Court of Appeals did not decide the
specific issue of unconscionability, the
opinion it wrote is extremely important
for the content it gave to the concept of
"unconscionability"
and the openings
which that concept now provides for
Particularly imfurther development.
portant are the factors the court indicated
to be relevant in determining "unconscionability": the absence of meaningful
choice on the part of one party to the
contract, combined with contract terms
unreasonably favorable to the other party
to the contract. The court further expanded on the "meaningful choice" aspect
by declaring that its presence or absence
"

30 on item 2, purchased December 31, 1957
(price $13.21)" and similar proportions on
items 3 through 16. Skelton & Helstad, Protection of the Installment Buyer of Goods
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65
MICH. L. REV. 1465, 1477 (1967).

Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
198 A.2d 914, 916 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964).
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was to be determined in light of all the
facts and circumstances existing at the
time the contract was made and, that
its absence could be shown by a gross
inequality in bargaining power.
Furthermore, "meaningful choice" can
be indicated by the manner in which the
contract was made:
Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack

of ft, have a reasonable opportunity to
understand the terms of the contract, or
were the important terms hidden in a
maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices? 24
As to the "reasonableness" of the contract terms themselves, the court again
posited a factual test, this time in terms
of the general commercial background
and the commercial needs of the particular trade. It stated the test in Corbin's
terms: "are the terms so extreme as to
appear unconscionable according to the
mores and business practices of the time
and place?" 25
Since the implications of the opinion
are so potentially vast and so important
in their possible effect on literally millions
of persons like Mrs. Williams, the tests
posited by the court merit detailed
examination and evaluation.

volving a low-income consumer who, in
reality, has no bargaining power other
than the rather futile and self-defeating
threat to abstain from consumption of a
Perhaps of
particular item entirely. 26
even greater significance to the case of
the ordinary low-income consumer is the
court's explicit recognition of the relevance of an obvious lack of education to
the issue of whether he was capable of
understanding the contract terms or even
of finding them in a maze of "fine print"
and "puffing." The barely educated lowincome consumer is clearly no match for
the kind of legal brinksmanship 22 displayed in the drafting involved in the
Williams case, since even the court felt
called upon to describe the pro rata payment clause as a "rather obscure provision." Is It seems reasonable to assert
that most terms inserted in fine print
contracts, especially those dealing with
"charges" and the seller's remedies, will
be beyond the comprehension of such
an uneducated consumer. The argument
against such an approach generally is
put in terms such as those used by the

26This

is not to

dismiss

the

possibility of

Since a prime indication of this factor,
according to Williams, is one party's gross
inequality in bargaining power, it seems
rather clear that this aspect will be rather
generally and easily met in a case in-

organization by low-income consumers to arrange the withholding of their consumption as
a group and thereby to bring economic pressure on the retail merchant as a means of
extracting more even-handed treatment from
him.
27 "Business lawyers tend to draft to the edge
of the possible. Any engineer makes his construction within a margin of safety. . . The
only doubt that comes up in regard to un-

24Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,

the absolute limit of what the law can conceivably bear." 1 N.Y. LAW REV. COMM'N,

Lack of Meaningful Choice

350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
added).
2 ld. at 450, citing 1 A. CORBIN,

§ 128 (1963).

(emphasis

conscionability is, if you start drafting up to

REPORT AND HEARINGS ON THE UNIFORM COM-

177 (1954)
fessor Karl Llewellyn).
28 350 F.2d at 447.
MERCIAL CODE

CONTRACTS

(remarks of Pro-
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California Committee which rejected the
section: it would subject to court "renegotiation" allegedly unfair terms which
the parties had "accepted." But, even in
terms of this argument, the meaningful
choice test is reasonable since it goes to
the very issue of whether one party has
actually accepted such terms. The Williams approach clearly rejects any rigid
formalism such as is expressed in the
concept that, once a party affixes his
signature to a writing, he is deemed to
know of and assent to its contents. To
the argument that such a test would
render contracts with low-income consumers commercially worthless and incapable of providing certainty of expectation, the very simple answer is that the
user of the printed form contract can
obviate this problem rather easily. He
can give the consumer a "reasonable
opportunity to understand the terms of
the contract" by making full and fair
disclosure of the contract terms and their
legal effect in simple language. On the
point of disclosure, there is no conceivably plausible reason why the seller
should be unwilling to do so unless, of
course, there is a realization that full and
fair disclosure would lead even the
"captive" low-income consumer to forego
his purchase. If the latter is the objection to disclosure as a means of assuring
a meaningful choice, it needs no discussion to show that it merits no weight.
Alternatively, if disclosure were opposed
as too heavy a burden to be borne by
the merchant, the legislature could impose a "cooling-off" period during which
the consumer would be able to seek legal
or other advice as to the terms and their
legal effect so that he could then make
a meaningful choice as to whether to ac-
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cept or reject the contract. 29

If, upon
seeking and obtaining such advice, he
finds himself unwilling to accept those
terms, he could then inform the seller of
his decision within the "cooling-off"
period and the contract would be without effect. To make such a provision
really effective, the merchant should be
obliged to give the consumer written
notice, perhaps in statutorily mandated
language, of the "cooling-off" period and
the choices available to the consumer.
The merchant whose terms are fair and
reasonable has nothing to fear from disclosure of those terms to the buyer; the
merchant whose terms are less than fair
and reasonable cannot and should not be
permitted to call on the law to carry
those terms into effect for him.
Terms Unreasonably Favorable
The Williams court posited this test as
the necessary conjunctive "to meaningful
choice." It delineated the test in terms
of the "general commercial background
and needs of the trade" and further defined it in terms of the "mores and business practices of the time and place" of
the contract. If read and applied literally, this language would virtually guarantee that the apparent benevolence of
the "unconscionability" provision would
never become anything more than apparent. For, if the "time and place" were

See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 500-202
(c) (4) (Supp. 1964) (buyer has until 5
P.M. of next business day within which to
cancel).
Such a provision has been recommended by a committee of the New York
Legislature.
N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COM29

MITTEE ON CONSUMER PROTECTION, FIRST ANN.

REP. 37 (1965-66).
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considered in terms of the Washington,
D.C. ghetto in 1962, the pro rata payment clause in Williams may well have
been in accord with the mores and business practices of the merchants dealing
with consumers like Mrs. Williams. It
seems rather obvious, however, that the
section was not intended to enshrine
overreaching and oppressive contract
terms merely because a trade or a particular segment of a trade has either expressly or as a matter of practice adopted
overreaching as a sales technique. 0 To
the extent that the court posited the test
in such language, it is an unfortunate
obstacle to the enlightened use of the
section. It would seem preferable to
state the test in such a way as to test
the terms of the contract in relation to
what a reasonably fair and conscientious
businessman would be willing to impose
on a buyer of Mrs. Williams' education
and economic status. To the objection
that this test is predicated upon a nonexistent standard or one which is highly
abstract, it need only be said that the law
has long recognized the utility of fictions
and abstractions such as the "reasonable
man," the "ordinarily prudent person"
and the "average person." Whether the
particular test is adopted or not, it seems
clear that the test posited in Williams
30"[I1s

there

any

principle

which

is more

familiar or more firmly embedded in the history of Anglo-American law than the basic
doctrine that the courts will not permit themselves to be used as instruments of inequity
and injustice? Does any principle in our law
have any more universal application than the
doctrine that courts will not enforce transactions in which the relative positions of the
parties are such that one has unconscionably
taken advantage of the necessities of the other?"
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315
U.S. 289 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.).

cannot be applied literally without rendering its apparent progress in this area a

mere illusion.

Even that conclusion,

however, is merely the starting point since

the test must still be applied in particular cases.-1

The Williams pro rata pay-

ment clause would clearly seem to be one
which could be found "unreasonably
favorable" to the seller, even though the
opinion did not go to the merits of the

case. The question, however, is the basis
upon which that clause could be found
unconscionable. It is contended that,
even though the court posited the test
conjunctively in terms of "choice" and
the nature of the terms themselves, it
can be argued that the absence of mean-

ingful choice is the key to unconscionability since it goes to the very issue of
whether one party really had the opportunity to "accept" the terms of the con-

31 In Unico v. Owen, 51

N.J. 101, 232 A.2d
405 (1967), the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that a "waiver of defenses" clause protecting the assignee of a consumer goods
installment
contract
was
not enforceable
against the consumer because, in the circumstances of the relation between the seller and
the assignee, enforcement would be unconscionable within the meaning of New Jersey's
"unconscionability" section. N.J. STAT. ANN.
12A:2-302 (1962);
In Frostifresh Corp. v.
Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757
(Dist. Ct. 1966),
the seller, through a
Spanish-speaking salesman, sold a refrigerator
which cost $348 to Spanish-speaking buyers
for $1145.
The sales "pitch" was made
in Spanish but the contract was entirely
in English. The trial court found it unconscionable (based on status of buyers and
"price and terms shocking to the conscience")
and allowed the seller to recover only his net
cost, less what the buyers had paid. But,
appellate term reversed, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281
N.Y.S.2d 964 (1967), as to damages and
allowed the seller to recover "reasonable profit
plus trucking and service charges and reasonable finance charges."

14
tract. In this light, the factor of "unreasonably favorable" terms has bearing
on meaningful. choice since the more
complex the terms, the more detailed
their provisions for the seller's benefit
and the more hidden they are in a maze
of fine print, the more likely it becomes
that the buyer had no meaningful choice
in accepting or rejecting the contract.
Thus, according to this view, a pyramiding of seller's remedies, which, if taken
singly might be perfectly reasonable,
could be found to be unreasonably favorable where the buyer has had no reasonable opportunity to understand the contract terms. Such an interpretation of
Williams is by no means assured and
might be considered radical and unwarranted by more conservative standards.
But, the very holding of Williams itself,
prior to its decision, might also have
been considered unwarranted from that
same point of view. Nevertheless, the
important point is that this interpretation
presents a reasonable possibility of bringing the force of law to bear on the problem of protecting and affirmatively aiding
the low-income consumer. Its very existence in a decided opinion by a court
such as the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals should serve as a spur
to businessmen to review their practices
and diminish their harshness in order to
avoid the prospect of having the contract,
or part of it, found unconscionable and
unenforceable. In addition, it can serve
as a useful tool in the practical protection of the individual, especially in the
hands of a legal services attorney who is
most likely to be representing a person
who clearly and easily falls within the
description offered by the court in Williams.
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Apart from this specific question, there
are more general considerations involved
in the probems of the low-income consumer and they should be mentioned
briefly if only to prompt more detailed
treatment of them. A persistent question
arises as to the position occupied by
banks and finance companies in the
transactions between merchants and lowincome consumers. Their insulation from
the buyer's real complaints against the
seller through their status as "holders in
due course" often tends to result in a
real injustice to that buyer. There have
been recommendations that the status be
postponed by lengthening the period during which the buyer can notify the bank
or finance company of defenses against
the seller and there has even been legislation abolishing the status in consumer
contracts.82 These proposals merit serious consideration since their inevitable
effect will be to force such financing
parties, out of mere self-interest, to be
more concerned with the fairness and
reputability of the sellers whose sales they
finance. But, even apart from the purely
legal aspects of the financing process, it
would seem that banks and finance companies should recognize a social responsibility to exert a positive influence on the
sales practices of those whom they finance.
Their very power in the economic sphere
carries with it an obligation to the public

To the plaint that such a provision would
put finance companies "out of business," one
need only look to their continued prosperity
in Massachusetts and Maryland where holder
in due course protection has been abolished
32

in consumer sales.

MASS.

GEN.

LAWS ANN.

ch. 255, § 12C (Supp. 1967); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 83, § 147 (1957).
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which cannot be ignored and their participation in or failure to prevent overreaching where they have an opportunity
to exert a socially responsible influence
cannot but be condemned.
Equally involved in the entire process
are the attorney who represents the merchant in drafting contracts and the attorney who undertakes the collection of
consumer indebtedness 3
They must
recognize a moral and ethical obligation
not just to the letter of the law but also
to its spirit. They are in an especially
pivotal position since, by their advice and
moral suasion, the overreaching involved
in consumer contracts can be avoided in
the first instance. This opportunity takes

33The Association of the Bar of the City
of New York has recently found it necessary
to
formulate
standards
for
"collection"
attorneys so as to protect debtors, particularly
"those living and working in ghetto areas."
N.Y.L.J. June 10, 1968, at 1, col. 1.
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on a special significance in an age when
the very validity of the law and particular
laws are called into question by those who
are economically and socially deprived on
the ground that the law operates in such
a way as to preserve that deprivation.
For, it is apparent that the law and those
involved in its application and enforcement are often looked upon by the poor
as the very means by which oppression
is practiced and sanctioned, rather than
as an instrument for the positive achievement of fairness and justice 4 In an age
of growing social consciousness, in which
governmental and private institutions are
increasingly participating, it is incumbent
upon the attorney to take a role of
leadership in seeing to it that the law
reflects that social concern, rather than
hindering it at the behest of the status quo.

See Shriver, Legal Services and the War on
Poverty, 14 CATHOLiC LAW. 92, 93 (1968).
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